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Abstract
Social engineering is a serious security threat to Online Social Networks (OSNs). Identity theft,
impersonation, phishing, and deception are some of the social engineering-based attacks that exploit
vulnerabilities of interpersonal relationships of online users. As a result, relationships in OSNs need to be
thoroughly examined. In this vein, we propose a relationship categorization model to evaluate relationship
strength based on graph-theoretic properties and social network analysis (SNA) methods. For example, in
Facebook, users may be categorized into close-neighbors, distant-neighbors, celebrities (influential by
admiration), authority (influential by power), and loners. Close-neighbors category will help identify a set of
trustworthy actors while an actor of distant-neighbors category should not be trusted as much as the former. A
celebrity category actor should be more accountable, while a loner category actor will probably be less
accountable. This type of categorization will help users engage in proper cybersecurity behaviors to avoid
social engineering-based attacks.
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INTRODUCTION  
Online social networks (OSNs) provide support for forming chains of relationships. 
For example, if T befriends X who in turn befriends Y then Y becomes a friend of 
T by way of X. Because of this friendship transitivity property such friendship 
chains can grow long with little if any participants’ control. Unfortunately this long 
chain of relationships brings with it an increased danger involving user data security 
especially data privacy. For example, by exploiting the network’s friend 
recommendation feature an ill-intended Facebook user can reach out to a large pool 
of unsuspecting users to conduct a social engineering attack. Unlike physical 
entities, e.g., organizations where data security enforcement can be applied through 
policy and accountability, the same is unlikely in OSNs. Even for organizations, 
social engineering could still pose a substantial problem even for disciplined 
employees since it involves the attacker capturing such employees’ trust for waging 
the attack. Such reasons, coupled with the increase in data breach cases, 
(E.g. the 2012 LinkedIn data breach case 
http://thehackernews.com/2016/05/linkedin-account-hack.html) make online data 
privacy threats increasingly worrisome. As a result, users’ interpersonal 
relationships in OSNs need to be examined to curb social engineering attacks. Such 
action would not only benefit OSN users but also, if incorporated by organization, 
would complement their existing security controls. 
The question addressed in our research is: can we develop a mechanism that uses 
social network analysis (SNA) to extract network properties of an OSN user to aid 
in avoiding a potential social engineering attacker in the OSN?  
We propose developing algorithms that can aid an online social network (OSN) 
user to perceive social engineering posture of a fellow user based on the latter’s 
network properties. The algorithms will categorize an OSN users’ interpersonal 
relationships considering graph-theoretic centrality properties of nodes in their 
network (e.g., betweenness, closeness, and eccentricity). The tool will be able to 
categorize network actors into authority, celebrity, and loner classes, which 
according to literature (e.g., Algani and Xu (2013), Festinger, and Carlsmith, 
(1959), Mitnick, Williams, and Wozniak, (2002), Weatherly, Miller, and 
McDonald, (1999)) can be relied upon in inferring social behavior such as social 
engineering.   
APPROACH  
 Our approach starts with extracting node and edge information of a social 
graph and defining its nodes characteristics based on their centrality.  This is 
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followed by (a) translating these characteristics in graph theoretic and (b) inferring 
the node behavior based on studies in the literatures.  
We implement a prototype of our approach through a Java program simulation 
that takes as input the nodes of a social network and classifies them into either 
celebrity, loner, or authority based on their extracted network characteristics. From 
this classification the program then infers these nodes status as potential social 
engineering attacker based on the studies in the literature.  
RESULTS 
  As seen in Fig 1, our simulation results include the display of a sociomatrix 
showing all the vertices paths, sum of all shortest paths for each vertex of graph, 
number of all shortest paths of graph, closeness centrality of each vertex of graph, 
radius and diameter of graph, average betweenness centrality of graph, category of 
each vertex of graph (celebrity, loner, authority), and a warning of any possible 
social engineers. 
 
Fig. 1.  A SNAPSHOT OF OUR SIMULATION OUTPUT WITH BLUEJ 
 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 We observed that social graphs in OSNs can grow quickly. Just an extra one 
member added to the network n nodes can add up to n-1 new edges. For this reason 
we had to limit our simulated network size to just a few nodes.  We plan to test a 
larger number and more realistic group of vertices from a real life OSN in order to 
represent a more real worldly situation. 
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